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The German temporary staffing industry: growth, development, scandal 
and resistance 
Abstract 
In Germany the size of the temporary agency workforce has almost doubled in 
between 2002 and 2012 prompted by deregulation and expansion of temporary 
staffing agency networks.  This article examines the growth of the temporary 
staffing industry in Germany revealing important milestones in the regulatory 
framework transformation. The article then explores the role of key actors in the 
development of temporary staffing industry in the Germany labour market, in 
particular the shifting positions of trade unions in relation to temporary agency 
work, as well as intervention from the state with re-regulation in order to mitigate 
for exploitative affecting temporary agency workers. The findings highlight that 
while the growth of the German temporary staffing industry has been 
substantial, and that the state has been an active agent, it has not been without 
its controversies and challenges, and that features of the industry remain 
potential barriers for its future development.  
 
Key words: temporary agency work, Germany, trade unions, employment  
Introduction 
In 2012 a minimum wage for temporary agency workers was introduced in 
Germany, a year before the country’s national minimum wage was approved for 
all sectors (BBC, 2014; Stettes, 2012), indicating a recognition of the 
importance placed on regulating for ‘decent work’ (ILO, 1999) in the Germany 
temporary staffing industry (TSI). The development of this legislation revealed 
the key relationships and tensions that surround the issue of temporary agency 
work in Germany. After a series of deregulatory measures since 1972 when 
temporary agency work was legalised, the industry has grown significantly, 
almost doubling between 2002-2012 (BA, 2015). Despite significant growth in 
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the number of workers, the proportion of temporary agency work in overall 
employment did not reach higher than 2.1% (slightly higher than the EU 
average of 1.7%) suggesting there were potential barriers to growth (BA, 2015).  
 
Since the late 1980s the temporary staffing industry (TSI) has experienced a 
substantial increase in size and presence in labour markets across the globe 
(Coe, Johns and Ward, 2007). By 2010, Europe represented the largest 
regional entity for the TSI, constituting 38% of the industry's €247 billion global 
revenue, and a 25% of the global number off temporary staffing agencies (Ciett, 
2012a). The TSI traditionally concentrated in the manufacturing and service 
sectors has expanded into many different areas of the economy, evolving from 
a small-scale service provider, located in a handful of large industrial and major 
administrative centres, to a near ubiquitous and diversified business sector 
(Neugart and Storrie, 2006; Spermann, 2011; Jahn and Bentzen, 2012). 
Growing to over 9,400 agencies and over 838,000 temporary agency workers 
by 2014 (BA, 2015), the growth of the TSI in Germany has been rapid, but not 
without controversy or resistance. The wider institutional context contributed to 
a national system for temporary staffing which was had previously been largely 
shaped by interactions between trade associations, trade unions, and 
government through processes of collective bargaining (Coe, Johns and Ward, 
2009; Coe and Ward, 2014).  
 
This paper provides insights into the German TSI to examine the importance of 
relationships within the wider institutional framework of the industry in 
determining its characteristics. First, the key growth dynamics of the TSI are 
explored, followed by an overview of how the current regulatory framework 
developed. The issue of regulation is then used to explore important drivers of 
change in the Germany temporary staffing agencies, revealing a number of 
controversies and challenges. Changes to the landscape of trade associations 
and trade unions relevant for the temporary agency worker sector are explored 
before discussion of an important event related to the use of in-house 
 3 
temporary staffing agencies which began to raise the profile of exploitative 
practices affecting temporary agency workers. The article then moves to chart 
the developments which led to the minimum wage for temporary agency 
workers in Germany, a significant milestone in the regulatory history of 
temporary agency work in the country. Together these issues reveal how the 
state has acted as both a de-regulator and re-regulator at different times, and in 
doing so has made efforts to mitigate exploitative practices in the temporary 
staffing sector, but also how other key relationships present challenges for the 
growth of temporary agency work in Germany.  
 
Researching temporary agency work in Germany 
 
Temporary agency work (TAW) involves a triangular relationship between an 
employer (firm), an agency (a second firm), and a worker, whereby an agency 
hires workers for the purpose of placing them in contracted placements (often 
open-ended) provided by client firms (Houseman, 2001; Mitlacher; 2007; Nielen 
and Schiersch, 2014). But beyond this triangular relationship there are a range 
of key actors (and interactions) which constitute a national temporary staffing 
industry: regulations on temporary staffing agencies and mainstream 
employment; welfare provision; involvement of the state in employment; 
national and international trade bodies; trade unions; domestic temporary 
staffing agencies; transnational temporary staffing agencies; and the 
composition of the wider economy (Coe et al, 2009; Coe and Ward, 2014). 
 
The research for this article was conducted as part of a wider project which 
examined different institutional contexts for the TSI in three countries to 
represent different socio-economic systems as well as TSIs of different size, 
form, and maturity. Informed by wider discussions around national systems of 
production, ‘varieties of capitalism’, business and welfare systems (Becker, 
2009; Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1997; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hall and 
Soskice, 2001; Hancke et al, 2007; Lane and Wood, 2009; Whitley, 1999), 
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Germany, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom were selected in order 
to reflect broadly different socio-economic systems (see Author, forthcoming). 
Here Germany represented an exemplar of a corporatist policy regulatory 
context characterised by significant human capital investment, medium term 
employment relationships, high standards of employment protection, strong 
union representation in a tripartite system and strong public sector involvement 
in placing workers in employment1.  
 
The findings discussed here focus on the German case, formed from extensive 
reviews of available secondary data and grey literature as well as, interviews 
with stakeholders from across the industry: including temporary staffing 
agencies (both domestic and transnational), trade associations, trade unions, 
and governments representatives. In total 27 interviews were conducted in 
Germany between 2009 and 2012 with a further 5 interviews in 2013 in order to 
clarify the impact of any developments in the industry. This sought to contribute 
to discussions around the formation of nationally distinctive temporary staffing 
industries (Coe, Johns and Ward; 2009; Coe and Ward; 2014), the position of 
the TSI in the labour market (Ciett, 2012b), and the roles of particular actors in 
shaping the temporary staffing market (Coe, Johns and Ward, 2009, 2011, 
2012; Peck and Theodore, 2002; 2007). It aimed to highlight the key 
relationships which shape the growth and development of the TSI in Germany, 
extending the existing literature about TAW in the Germany context (see Antoni 
and Jahn, 2009; Jahn and Bentzen, 2012; Jahn and Ochel, 2007; Jahn and 
Pozzoli, 2013; Mitlacher, 2007; Nivalainen, Jahn and Singer, 2015 Spermann, 
2011; 2013b).  
 
In the context of rapid growth of TAW, some scholars sought to examine the 
role of, and demand for, temporary agency work in the labour market (Burda 
and Kvasnicka 2004; Jahn and Ochel, 2007; Jahn and Bentzen, 2012; 
                                            
1
 This was alongside the UK representing a neoliberal policy environment, and the Czech 
Republic as a post-socialist regime. 
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Mitlacher, 2007), highlighting the potential role of temporary staffing agencies to 
provide training (Spermann, 2011), to be used as a strategy to adjust to 
seasonal fluctuations in demand (Holst et al. 2010), or as a part of  wider 
workforce strategy (Beckmann and Kuhn, 2009). Although as Spermann 
(2013b) later identified, the proposition of TAW as an important tool for 
flexbilisation has been criticised, particularly by trade unions, on the grounds 
that it represents a threat to the standard employment model (Dauser, 2009; 
Wetzel & Weigand, 2011), that there are significant disadvantages for workers 
who engage in temporary agency work, and that pay differences remain 
between permanent and agency workers (Spermann, 2013). Further 
investigation into these issues has revealed mixed results (Baumgarten & 
Kvasnicka, 2012; Jahn and Weber, 2013). For the German case other scholars 
have sought to examine the experience of TAW in terms of wage differentials 
(Jahn and Pozzoli, 2011; Neinhüser and Matiaske, 2006), and potential for TAW 
to act as a stepping stone to employment (Gebel, 2013; Kvasnicka, 2009). 
While these studies examined the experience of temporary agency workers, 
and charted some developments in terms of how these workers are used, a 
broad overview of the German TSI has yet to be explored in detail. This article 
seeks to address this research lacuna by presenting the institutional context for 
the German TSI, illustrating key actors, and some of their actions, which have 
contributed to its development, providing another example of a national distinct 
TSI (Coe, Johns and Ward, 2009). The article begins with an overview of the 
development of TAW in Germany, presented in the next section, to set the 
context for this.  
 
Charting the growth of the German temporary staffing industry  
The German TSI has experienced substantial growth since the early 1970s, 
with particularly rapid growth since 2003, reaching revenues of €22.3 billion by 
2014 (an increase of 53% since 2009) (BA, 2011; Ciett, 2015). The penetration 
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rate of TAW in the German labour market more than trebled between 1996 and 
2010, by which time it had reached 1.9%, increasingly more modestly to 2.1% 
by 2014, ranking fourth in Europe behind the UK, Netherlands and Luxembourg 
and slightly above the European average of 1.7% (Ciett, 2015).  
 
Market access for temporary staffing agencies in Germany was historically 
restricted by regulation, in the form of sectoral bans and restrictions on the 
length of assignments (Eurofound, 2008). However, successive waves of 
deregulation have allowed greater use of TAW in the labour market. Steady 
growth in the number of temporary staffing agencies in Germany was 
experienced between 1996 and 2007, rising from 2,739 to 9,465 - a 231% 
increase (BA, 2015).  As in most countries in Europe the financial crisis led to a 
decline in the number of agencies, which fell to 6,049 in 2010, rising against to 
around 9,400 by 2014 (BA, 2015).  
 
Exhibiting characteristics of the mature TSIs of the UK, the market for 
temporary staffing agencies in Germany remained fragmented. Even the largest 
temporary staffing agency in Germany, Randstad (a transnational firm), with an 
annual revenue of nearly €1.9 billion and 60,000 temporary agency workers 
placed – only had a market share of just under 10% (Lünendonk, 2009; 2014). 
Furthermore, half of these agencies had less than 20 workers on placements at 
any time, 36% had between 20-100 workers, and only 14% had more than 100 
workers, highlighting the prevalence of small agencies with their own small 
cohort of workers in the German market (BA, 2012). This is indicative of the 
wider business landscape in Germany where 80% of businesses are small 
businesses (Brucker et al, 2012) and where SMEs, the Mittelstand are 
considered the backbone of the economy (BWT, 2011). The difference between 
the revenues of the largest and smallest of these top 10 agencies illustrates the 
variation in size of agencies, and reinforces the supposition of smaller agencies 
dominating the German TSI.  
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TABLE 1 HERE 
  
Table 1 illustrates that even in a short period of time (2006-2013) a significant 
change occurred in revenue size experienced by the top agencies; the greatest 
being experienced by Adecco (231.4%) a transnational agency in the top 10 for 
Europe in terms of revenue, followed by two German agencies which although 
much smaller in revenue size, have grown significantly.  
 
While a very uneven pattern of change occurred for the agencies in terms of the 
number of temporary agency workers for these firms in between 2006-2013, 
this fluctuation did not correlate with the size of the agencies in terms of 
revenue or ranking position in the market. Reductions were experienced by 
Manpower (-5.0%) and Dekra Arbeit (-13.7%) only experienced minor changes 
in their overall revenue, so despite substantial losses in terms of numbers they 
were able to turn a profit. This could potentially be explained by a move towards 
higher margin work placements: 
 
'Definitely there has been a growth in the number of workers we deal with 
but also there have been shifts in the areas of market that we work with. 
There has been an increase in the number of professional placements 
which of course have a higher return per individual' (Transnational 
Agency, February 2013). 
 
The key message to draw from Table 1 is that while a range of large 
transnational agencies with high revenues and volumes of workers exist in 
Germany, the difference between the top and bottom of this group is 
substantial; the remainder of the market made up of the quintessential German 
business, the SME (Block and Spiegel, 2011).   
 
Temporary staffing agencies an important component of the German TSI, as 
shown in Figure 1, which illustrates key actors in the Germany TSI using the 
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model originally introduced by Coe, Johns and Ward (2009). These actors 
include the state, trade unions, trade associations as well as both domestic and 
transnational temporary staffing agencies. The relationship between these 
actors is what makes the German temporary staffing industry distinctive 
(Author, forthcoming), as has been seen in other national TSI varieties (Coe, 
Johns and Ward, 2009, 2011, 2012)  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE.  
 
The number of temporary agency workers in Germany has grown following the 
introduction of legislation which legalised TAW, in 1972 (See Figure 1). Growth 
continued in the 1980s and after the re-unification of Germany in 1989. From 
the middle of the 1990s TAW became a rapidly growing form of employment - 
between 2000 and 2014 the number of temporary agency workers more than 
doubled to 838,000 (BA, 2015). While TAW has risen it remains concentrated in 
the manufacturing and engineering sectors (over two thirds of workers) as well 
as transport and logistics (around 25% of workers) (BA, 2015), although is 
broadly indicative of strengths of the wider economy (Eichorst and Tobsch, 
2013). The most rapid period of growth followed the Hartz reforms in 2003, 
where legislative changes were made to deregulate the industry, and by 2013 
Germany had the third largest temporary agency workforce in the EU, after the 
UK and France (Ciett, 2015).  
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
Much like the UK, indications of changes in the economy in response to the 
financial crisis were reflected in the use of TAW between June 2008 and 2009, 
in the form of a 22.2% reduction - around 300,000 less temporary agency 
workers (BA, 2015). The reduced demand was attributed predominantly to client 
firms in the manufacturing sector protecting their 'core' workforce by reducing 
the number of temporary agency workers (Spermann, 2011). The substantial 
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expansion and ensuing contraction displayed the responsiveness of the 
German temporary staffing industry to the economic system (as has been 
observed elsewhere with temporary agency work and periods of recession, for 
example in the US, see Peck and Theodore, 2007). Expansion in TAW soon 
returned in the following months, reaching levels similar to 2008 in June 2010 
(BA, 2011) with a 6% increase for the first half of 2010 (BZA, 2011). German 
TAW has traditionally concentrated in the industrial occupations, reflecting the 
dominance of this sector in the wider economy; the largest users of temporary 
agency workers were in production of consumer goods, construction, mining, 
energy and water supply (BA, 2012).  
Regulation and collective bargaining in the German temporary staffing 
industry  
Until 1972 in Germany TAW was banned on the basis that it would disrupt the 
labour exchanges run by the Federal Employment Service (Spermann, 2011). 
However, this was deemed by the Federal Constitutional court to violate free 
choice of occupation and therefore temporary staffing agencies were allowed to 
operate (Clauwert, 2000). Enacted in 1972, the 
Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz (AÜG) or 'Temporary Employment Act' 
introduced a comprehensive and stringent regulatory framework for TAW in 
Germany at a time when the industry was still being established. 
 
Deteriorating labour market conditions and rising unemployment in the 1980s 
and 1990s (Lindlar and Scheremet, 1998) caused policy makers to reassess 
their restrictive stance towards TAW. A series of initially tentative deregulatory 
reforms followed (see Table 2). Starting in the mid-1980s, the reform process 
gained momentum in the second half of the 1990s, following the ending of the 
Federal Employment Service's monopoly on the placement of workers in 1994. 
This allowed temporary staffing agencies to operate more freely to place 
workers. These changes culminated in the Hartz reforms, which took place from 
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2003 went beyond previous policy initiatives, both in scope and depth by 
repealing a set of long-standing restrictive clauses of the AÜG (Akyol, Neugart 
and Pichler, 2013; Eichhorst and Marx, 2011; Leschke, Schmid, and Griga, 
2006). They also introduced equal treatment and equal pay clauses, and 
actively encouraged collective bargaining among the social partners to set the 
terms and conditions of employment in the TSI – through collective agreements. 
The deregulation summarised in Table 2 was designed to make the labour 
market more flexible, and to make TAW more feasible.  
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Collective agreements were a common feature in Germany, and they ensured 
the involvement of both trade unions and trade associations in labour relations 
(Müller-Jentsch, 1995). The collective agreements covered an estimated 95% of 
all temporary agency workers in Germany in 2009 (Industry Commentator, July 
2010), but even in the case of those who were not covered by collective 
agreements, agencies would often refer to one of these agreements to set 
wages for their work (Government Representative, September, 2011). 
Collective agreements represented a defining feature of the TSI in Germany, 
and indicated the wide range of trade unions and trade association involvement 
in the industry, unlike many of the other more mature temporary staffing 
markets in Europe where this tool was either not present or used to such an 
extent (Arrowsmith, 2006; Neinhüser and Matiaske, 2006; Wilthagen and Tros, 
2004). Through collective agreements trade unions and trade associations had 
a much more formalised and active role in the German labour market than 
witnessed elsewhere, as part of the German dual system of industrial relations 
(see Müller-Jentsch and Weitbrecht, 2003). The main focus of most collective 
agreements was the level of pay for agency workers, negotiated between the 
trade union and trade association (see for example BAP, 2011). The importance 
of these institutions is explored in the next section.  
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The changing landscape of trade unions, collective bargaining and trade 
associations  
While there had been a decline in trade union membership and the share of 
workers covered by collective agreements (Hirsch and Schnabel, 2013), the TSI 
remained one area of the labour market which retains a high coverage of 
workers through collective agreements (Ahlberg, 2008; Arrowsmith, 2006, 
Spermann, 2011) – estimates as high as 97% from respondents in this 
research. This in part was due to the terms of the Hartz reforms which stated 
that equal pay for agency workers was required unless there was an 
established collective agreement (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011).  
 
Despite such a high level of collective agreement coverage, temporary agency 
workers represented a small proportion of trade union membership (Dörre  et al, 
2006), estimated by Vitols (2004) in 2003 to be fewer than 5%. Until the late 
2000s trade unions in Germany had made little attempt to engage temporary 
agency workers as members). Despite temporary agency workers often 
receiving worse conditions and lower pay than their permanent counterparts, 
low levels of union membership can be explained by several factors. First, trade 
union culture had difficulty engaging temporary agency workers on the basis 
that work placements were often short term (less than 3 months) so workers 
may have felt they did not have the same attachment to an industry as 
permanent workers. Second, the traditional methods of attracting union 
members such as strikes, would be unlikely to attract agency workers as they 
would simply be sent back to the agency and likely made redundant.  
 
 In 2007 trade unions began to change their strategies regarding temporary 
agency workers. As the trade unions realised that the TAW sector was being 
supported by labour regulation; and therefore if they were to exert any influence 
over the way this form of employment was used, they would have to engage 
with issues related to this sector.  
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New activities from unions and union confederations included conducting 
research on the extent and characteristics of temporary agency work (DGB, 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010); publishing other documents related to temporary 
agency work (Verdi, 2007, 2009); creation of information portals for temporary 
agency workers, lobbying national and European Commission regarding 
legislation and creation of petitions around terms of use for temporary agency 
work (see Author, forthcoming).  While the undertones of trade union strategies 
remained critical of TAW, particularly IG Metall (2012; DGB, 2008), their 
activities, related to the sector took three main forms: establishing suitable 
collective agreements; providing guidance and practical assistance; and 
campaigning for change (IG Metall, 2007). It was argued that if skilled workers 
were to be used, it should only be to cover peaks in demand, not as a long-term 
personnel management strategy (IG Metall, 2007). There were three main 
strands of trade union campaigns: the realisation of the principle of equal 
treatment and equal pay, the reduction of the use of TAW, and the recruitment 
of temporary agency workers in an attempt to organise the sector. By ensuring 
equal pay and therefore raising the costs of agency workers, it was hoped that 
firms would reduce their use and opt for permanent workers). 
 
One of the most active unions on issues of TAW was IG Metall which launched 
campaign in 2008 on the negative impact of TAW and established the initiative 
Leiharbeit fair gestalten: Gleiche Arbeit – Gleiches Geld – Equal Work for Equal 
Pay (IG Metall, 2008). The union carried out research on the extent and 
activities of the TSI, providing information for temporary agency workers 
regarding equal pay, ensuring existing agreements on pay were implemented in 
the workplace and pushing for the use of TAW to be high on the discussion 
agenda, not only for unions, but for other employment institutions too (IG Metall, 
2007, 2010, 2012).  
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While trade unions were keen to promote the fair treatment of temporary 
agency workers, they also stressed that TAW should not be used as a 
substantial part of the workforce (Trade Union, March 2010). This became 
evident in 2012, when Lufthansa announced it intended to hire a further 200 
temporary agency workers to work as flight attendants it was met by calls from 
the union Ver.di and by flight attendants union UFO (Unabhängige Flugbegleiter 
Organisation) to change their plans (Wall Street Journal, 2012). More hints at 
underlying negative views of TAW were made by the DGB (the union federation 
which negotiated the two major collective agreements), which argued that TAW 
failed as an employment mechanism and was disintegrating the working world 
(DGB, 2007; 2008), and by IG Metall (2011) which continued to use a slogan 
that implied TAW was modern slavery. Despite this opposition, some unions 
actively sought to increase their temporary agency worker members (Meyer and 
Fuchs, 2008). IG Metall made efforts through campaigns to recruit TAW 
members, on the premise that they were usually difficult to reorganise at the 
level of the agency, and also set up networks for communication for temporary 
agency workers at the local level (Meyer and Fuchs, 2008). Efforts at recruiting 
temporary agency workers were variable (Wölfe, 2008), although as Meyer and 
Fuchs (2008) have shown in the case of IG Metall membership, this was in part 
a reflection of the spatial distribution of TAW in Germany, concentrating around 
manufacturing and industrial centres.  
 
There appear to have been two strategies from trade unions: on the one hand, 
oppose TAW, and on the other recruit their members. One union took their role 
in TAW further. The DGB also established part ownership of the temporary 
staffing agency Start Zeitarbeit (Heninng, 2011). Therefore, it not only 
contributed to the legal basis by which temporary staffing could be deployed 
across the country, but also would benefit to some extent from the profits of it. 
Much like the government, unions recognised that TAW was now a feature of 
the German labour market, and that in order to work towards a model where 
TAW could be used effectively, reduce exploitative practices and protect the 
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interests of their permanent workforce members, they had to engage with TAW 
issues and stakeholders.  
 
Here it is important to acknowledge another key component of the collective 
bargaining relationship - the trade associations; and as of 2014 there were two 
remaining trade associations for the TSI, outlined in Table 3.  
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
In April 2011, BZA (Federal Association of Temporary Work Agencies) 
announced a merger with AMP (Association of Medium sized Temporary 
Employment Agencies) in order to form one larger organisation BAP (Federal 
Employers' Association of Personnel Services), representing approximately 
70% of Germany's temporary agency workers, changing the overall trade 
association components of the TSI (Stettes, 2012).The changes took place in 
response to legal developments following evidence of malpractice. In December 
2010 the Berlin Labour Court (BAG) made a ruling which disqualified Christian 
Trade Unions for Temporary Employment (CGZP), from having the right to 
negotiate minimum salaries for temporary agency workers as the unions were 
not representative of their members. This affected mainly small and medium 
sized agencies (through AMP) and CGZP was accused of lobbying for the 
employer while disguising itself as a trade union, consistently negotiating for 
collective agreements with significantly lower wages than other unions (SIA, 
2011d). Uncovering unfair practices was just one example in the German case 
that prompted institutional change, in this case the merger of trade associations.  
Further changes to the TSI landscape were instigated by what is referred to in 
the media as the ‘Schlecker scandal’, discussed in the next section.  
Uncovering the practices of in-house agencies 
After the deregulation of the TSI through the Hartz reforms (Jacobi and Kluve, 
2006), some firms began establishing in-house temporary staffing agencies 
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(Wirtschafts Woche, 2010). These agencies were separate entities established 
by firms, often as a subsidiary with the remit of supplying temporary agency 
workers to the host firm. For example, DB Zeitarbeit, owned by Deutsche Bahn 
for work in the railway industry (Deutsche Bahn, 2012); and AutoVision owned 
by Volkswagen for work in the automotive industry (AutoVision, 2015). The 
largest of these agencies for 2009 are detailed in Table 4. Referring to the 
situation in 2009: 
 
‘It was estimated that around 7% of companies [referring to large employers] 
had established their own in house agency, or at least an internal agency unit 
designed to deal with human resources’ (Trade Association, January 2011).  
 
While some in-house agencies were established to facilitate a more efficient 
use of temporary agency workers, as was the case of for DB Zeitarbeit, they 
were also thought to be established to evade collective agreements (Trade 
Association, March 2010). In some cases agencies engaged in 'revolving door' 
practices, whereby permanent workers were made redundant and then re-
employed through their own in-house agency at a much lower wage (Spiegel, 
2010b). The most high profile example of these practices was that of Europe's 
largest pharmaceutical chain, Schlecker. The company made a large number of 
their workers redundant and re-employed them through their own in-house 
agency, Meniar, at significantly lower wages, and without the benefits of 
permanent employment (Spiegel, 2010b). 
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
The Schlecker scandal received widespread media attention in Germany 
(Focus, 2010), and put the firm under pressure from the government and wider 
society, to change its policy of using staff from the in-house agency. The firm 
had been closing some of its smaller branches and opening up new larger 
branches, re-employing the same staff through the agency and paying wages 
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around €6-7 an hour, significantly lower than workers would have received had 
they still been employed on a permanent contract (Spiegel, 2010a). The 
scandal highlighted the potential misconduct that was evident in the use of in-
house agencies, and contributed to the negative image and poor reputation that 
TAW had developed in many sectors of German society (Spermann, 2013a). In 
addition, there was indication that this was not an isolated case; DGB (the 
largest confederation of trade unions in Germany), highlighted that firms, 
particularly in the engineering sector, were often replacing employees with 
temporary agency workers on significantly lower pay (either through an in-
house agency or separate agency): 
 
‘For year’s we’ve been seeking a creeping process in which workforces 
are being replaced by agency workers’ (WAZ, 2010) 
 
While this may seem like a simple case of undesirable practices being reported, 
it was significant in the German case because it prompted high profile 
responses, and generated discussions which led to more significant changes in 
the German TSI. Schlecker ceased its practices of using the in-house agency 
after high levels of pressure from the highest echelons of German society. The 
Federal Employment Minister, Ursula von der Leyen, developed the name 'Red 
Baroness' in the press after publicly criticising the firm's use of these agencies 
to exploit its staff (Financial Times Germany, 2010). This is significant, as it is 
extremely rare for a cabinet minister to voice such a direct criticism of an 
individual firm, and for Ministers to be publicly discussing the practices of 
temporary staffing agencies.  
 
The Schlecker scandal even provoked an explicit criticism from Chancellor 
Angela Merkel, who stated that she would not act passively when 'companies 
like drugstore chain Schlecker simply sack their staff and re-employ them at half 
the pay via staffing agencies', and that these practices were 'bordering on 
immoral'' (Die Zeit, 2011). The scandal highlighted to government that an 
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element of regulation and monitoring was needed in the German TSI. It sparked 
debates in the German Parliament, and parliamentary questions led to the 
confirmation that there were a significant number of breaches of regulation by 
temporary staffing agencies - rising from 510 in 2005 to 2,139 in 2008. These 
agencies were fined more than €3.72 million in 2009 (SIA, 2010d). Breaches of 
regulation included failure to pay social security contributions, late payment of 
taxes, failure to pay the correct salaries, and failure to allow holidays for 
temporary agency workers (SIA, 2010d).  
 
The government were keen to stress that breaches of regulations, laws and 
agreements would not be accepted and could incur a fine up to €500,000, and 
as a response  to these events, in 2011 the BA (Bundesagentur für Arbeit), the 
Federal Employment Agency, employed an extra 25 inspectors, bringing the 
total to 100 -  almost twice the number of the Employment Agency Inspectorate 
in the UK (BA, 2011). Temporary staffing agencies, both transnational and 
domestic were keen to stress that they were critical of the poor practices 
witnessed from some agencies, and were in support of the breaches of law 
being addressed, and appropriate measures brought into place; so unlike 
regulations on wages, intervention in this area of the industry was welcomed. 
 
'There are not just a few black sheep in the industry. There are dirty 
tricks, which some agencies use regularly. Holiday and sickness pay are 
systematically avoided in order to save money. Temporary employees 
are intentionally incorrectly categorised in order to employ people on 
'minor job schemes' for longer than is legal….The industry must sort this 
out and we have to do something about people's impression that we are 
making money by paying people badly. Temporary employment does not 
just have a communication problem. It has a problem with the way some 
in this industry operate. The Schlecker scandal was an absolute 
nightmare for temporary employment because it showed how incorrectly 
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the industry sees and represents itself. We have to start taking criticism 
seriously' (Managing Director, USG People Germany, SIA, 2010f). 
 
In the wake of the Schlecker scandal, some employers sought to distance 
themselves from the use of in-house agencies. For example, the chemical giant 
Bayer sold its in-house temporary staffing agency Job@ctive to Hanfried 
Personaldiensleistungen, a temporary staffing agency based in Hamburg. Both 
companies have a policy of treating staff fairly' (SIA, 2010b).  
 
While the use of in-house agencies represented a relatively small proportion of 
the overall temporary agency workforce (which itself only represented around 
2.1% of the Germany workforce) (Industry Commentator, December, 2011), the 
media attention paid to such practices raised the profile of TAW in the public 
domain (Focus, 2010; Spiegel, 2010a), and acted as a driver for these issues to 
enter the political sphere to a greater extent. Due to this attention the Schlecker 
scandal, as it became known, was a key event and driver which led to 
government intervention which sought to reduce exploitative practices in the 
TAW sector. However, through this event the TSI gained a negative image 
within Germany driven by media exposure of poor pay and working conditions 
of temporary agency workers, with temporary agency work presented as the 
epitome of vulnerable and insecure employment (which is not always the case – 
see Spermann, 2013a). 
 
Interactions in the fight for a minimum wage for temporary agency 
workers 
The discussions on labour market reforms for the TSI that followed the 
Schlecker scandal were instigated by Minister for Employment, Ursula von der 
Leyen (CDU), who encouraged the introduction of a legally binding minimum 
wage for all temporary agency workers in Germany (Spiegel, 2012). In order to 
understand the key events in these discussions and the eventual decisions, a 
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timeline is presented. Germany did not have a nationally binding minimum wage 
at the time, as it was negotiated on a sector by sector basis between unions 
and employers (or employers’ associations), and as mentioned earlier in this 
article for TAW this was largely addressed by collective agreements 
(Arrrowsmith, 2009). The Minister suggested that employers and unions should 
agree on a legally binding minimum wage for all temporary agency workers, 
whether they were members of any union or not, as well as outlawing the 
'revolving door' practices of some in-house agencies. 
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
In contrast, the Federal Minister for Economics and Technology, Rainer 
Brüderle (FDP) had fundamentally different views on the introduction of a 
minimum wage,  remarking: 
 
'It is generally a mistake for governments to set minimum salary levels. 
Minimum salary agreements in the temporary employment sector are 
perfectly adequate. The government must not interfere' (SIA, 2010e). 
 
An interesting development took place when the Free Democrats (FDP), who 
diametrically opposed the concept of a minimum wage, put forward proposals 
that supported an 'equal pay for equal work' concept for all temporary agency 
workers, as this would be more in line with the requirements of the EU Agency 
Workers Directive (EC, 2008). The EU Temporary Agency Workers Directive 
(2008.104/EC) was the result of over a three decade of discussions and 
negotiations to reach an agreement on the regulation for temporary agency 
workers. The Directive was created as it was felt by many of the social partners 
and national institutions in Europe that the TSI needed regulation at a similar 
level across Europe. Its main aim was to establish a level of equal treatment for 
agency workers across the EU, as part of a wider EU attempt to address 
atypical work (Countouris and Horton, 2009). The Directive, aimed at 
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harmonising regulations for TAW across Europe in terms of pay and conditions, 
and removing unjust restrictions did not affect Germany to a great extent as 
wages were already set through collective agreements (Trade Association, 
December 2011)2. 
 
It became evident that while trade unions recognised the need for minimum 
standards in the TSI - to bring it in line with other industries more generally - 
there was hostility from all trade unions (and a few government representatives) 
regarding the issue of equal pay for equal work (Financial Times Germany, 
2010). The drive to ensure a minimum wage was also related to the opening of 
the German market to Eastern European workers from 1st May 2011. The 
concern was that Eastern European agencies would facilitate the movement of 
workers across the national border with wages at a much lower level which 
could mean existing agencies would be priced out (BA, 2010). In an industry 
where many domestic agencies were operating on a very low profit margin - 
particularly at the low skilled end of the market - this could have been potentially 
detrimental. 
 
The concept of a minimum wage was generally accepted as a positive move by 
unions and some government officials: in contrast, the concept of equal pay for 
equal work was not as widely welcomed (2010, www.bza.de). 
A transnational agency manager echoed this view:  
 
'The concept of equal pay for equal work obviously appeals to the sense 
of justice of large sections of society. However, the palaver these people 
                                            
2
 This meant that Germany at this stage as ahead of some of the developments in regulation of 
TAW at the European level as a key component of the European Temporary Agency Workers 
Directive was to try to ensure equal treatment of workers. However, as most temporary agency 
worker wages were set at the sectoral level by a series of collective agreements this meant that 
in practice temporary agency workers did not yet experience full equal treatment to permanent 
workers with respect to pay, if this pay was set at a lower level. The main action required from 
Germany in response to the Directive was to remove restrictions on TAW in the construction 
sector – ‘unjust’ restrictions on TAW were required to be removed. The restriction was removed 
in November 2011 (SIA, 2011a). 
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are making bears no relation with reality. The collective know-how of a 
company is built over many years by its permanent employees. The fact 
that these permanent employees are simply more productive and create 
greater added value than agency temporary employees is only natural. 
That is the reason why they are paid more' (Transnational agency, 
February 2010). 
 
The trade unions however were broadly in favour of both minimum wage and 
equal pay for equal work: 
 
'The government needs to ensure that temporary employees earn the 
same amount as a permanent employee. We also need a minimum wage 
for temporary employees in order to prevent wage dumping at the bottom 
end of the income scale' (Trade Union, March 2010). 
 
In order to put pressure on the government regarding these issues, the DGB 
and its affiliate union IG Metall carried out a series of strikes across the country, 
as seen outside a Huber Technology factory in Öhringen (Hohenlohe Ungefilert 
(2011) outside a BMW factory in Regensburg (Regensburg Digital (2011), 
demonstrating the importance they placed on this issues. A key concern for 
many of the trade unions was the increasing prevalence of temporary agency 
workers in certain sectors, particularly when:  
 
'Permanent employment has become the exception. Temporary 
employment is beginning to seriously threaten permanent employment in 
this country [Germany]. It's alarming as it seems the government is 
opening all gates and doors for wage dumping with their new reform of 
the temporary employment sector because the reforms do not include 
any sort of time limit for the temporary employment contract…temporary 
employment is, and should be a part of a company's staffing policy. 
Temporary employment was designed to complement permanent 
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employment, it does not, and should not replace it' (Trade Union, March 
2010).  
 
Again this demonstrates that the trade unions had raised the profile of an issue 
with TAW, maintaining the momentum that had developed in response to the 
Schlecker scandal. While the temporary staffing agencies (both transnational 
and domestic) were generally in favour of TAW reforms, they were concerned 
about 'overregulation' which could inhibit future growth of an industry that has 
just begun.  
 
'Germany has come out of the [financial] crisis so well because 
employers were quickly able to react to the boom before employing more 
staff. Temporary employment was very important in this and one in each 
three new jobs is a temporary job. If we lose this flexibility, employers will 
become far more reluctant to hire new staff...Equal pay would deprive 
companies of their flexibility, create enormous bureaucracy and quite 
simply destroy jobs' (Transnational agency, May 2010). 
 
This is not surprising that temporary staffing agencies would against increased 
regulation, (or any other change that could affect their profit margin), there were 
concerns from agencies and firms who used temporary agency workers about 
the development of too much regulation which would not address the real 
mistreatment of such workers:  
 
'It is always a good thing to get rid of abuse but the Ministry for 
Employment should limit its actions to real cases of abuse [and not too 
much red tape]' (Transnational Agency, April 2010). 
 
Trade unions and BZA put a proposal forward for a collective agreement that 
ensured a minimum wage for all temporary agency workers in Germany in 
2011, it was accepted in the German Cabinet in the same year (SIA, 2011B). 
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The new minimum wage would be applied to all temporary agency workers in 
Germany from 1 January 2012 (Stettes, 2012). Wages were set at €7.89 per 
hour in Western Federal States, and €7.01 in Eastern Federal States (SIA, 
2011a). The wage disparity here points to the distinct regional variations the TSI 
experiences in Germany, and the labour market more generally (Niebuhr et al, 
2012; Möller, 2010), but also that the distinct history of the institutional 
development in the German system has impacted on the features of the 
industry (including the strength of unions and collective agreements).  
 
After this decision was made, trade unions and trade associations were both 
remained adamant that government should not be getting involved in wage 
setting as this was the territory of the trade associations and trade unions. While 
some viewed the issue of mistreatment of workers being brought to the 
foreground as positive, it meant that this led to a series of interventions from the 
state that affected their operations, which they felt were beyond the traditional 
remit of state involvement in the TAW sector. As one trade association stated 
when commenting about a merger of trade associations: 
 
'The recent negotiations about the minimum wage for temporary workers 
for as opposed to equal pay for equal work has demonstrated to the rest 
of the market how dependent the temporary staffing industry is on 
decisions made by politicians in Germany. Hopefully in the future we can 
work to make it less dependent, and combining our efforts [with other 
trade associations] is therefore an important step towards a better 
representation of the industry… and hopefully we will be able to move on 
from all the media attention about Schlecker and focus more on the 
benefits agency workers bring to the market' 
(Trade Association, November 2011). 
 
While the discussions surrounding minimum wages and equal pay may indicate 
that the government was in favour of encouraging TAW, this position was not 
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shared across those in government. The Business Minister of the Federal State 
of Thuringia, Mathias Machnig, announced in 2011 his intention to reduce 
investment subsidies (or cut them completely), for companies who employ 'too 
many agency employees' (SIA, 2011a). Proposals were made that employers 
with temporary agency workers as 10-30% of their workforce would only receive 
basic levels of investment subsidies as part of the labour cost subsidies system 
of the European Social Fund (ESF) (SIA, 2011c). This was followed in 2012 by 
the regional government of Saxony-Anhalt stating that firms where temporary 
agency workers represented more than 20% of staff would be excluded from 
public investment subsidies (Staatskanzlei des Landes Sachsen-Anhalt, 2012). 
BZA termed the plans 'discriminating and not legally tenable' as this would be in 
direct conflict with the European Agency Workers Directive (SIA, 2011a). A 
trade association commented that:  
 
'It's clearly making an unacceptable move of discrimination against 
agency work. Agencies would be severely disadvantaged even though 
they create regular jobs for people who are legally employed and pay 
their taxes and social security contributions. He is not thinking about both 
sides of the temporary work arguments and it's quite bizarre that the 
government wants to fight what is effectively one of the main engines of 
growth for Germany at the minute' (Trade Association, November 2010). 
 
Furthermore, BAP highlighted that the EU Agency Workers Directive was 
designed to remove unjustified restrictions, which these actions clearly 
contravened (BAP website, 2011). However, there was an even more extreme 
viewpoint from the left wing party Die Linke who made a case to the German 
Bundestag for the abolition of TAW completely on the grounds that agency 
workers were made to become second-class members of society (SIA, 2013).   
 
These developments signal three interesting points: first that there was still a 
level of hostility towards TAW in Germany from some areas of the state; second 
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it hints at a conflicting relationship between some of the trade associations and 
the government in the German system; and third the importance of politicians 
and state involvement in the German TSI as a driver of re-regulation. What is 
revealed is a  conflict in the German system; there was a need for flexibility in 
the labour market, acknowledged by government, temporary staffing agencies, 
trade associations and, to some extent, trade unions. However, where 
temporary agency workers grew to become a growing portion of the workforce 
(albeit still a relatively small proportion at 2.1% of the overall workforce), they 
were often met with resistance from trade unions, and some politicians. This 
conflict is not specific to Germany, the need for flexibility over the rise of 
precarious work, is well discussed (Barbieri, 2009; Bernhardt and Krause, 2013; 
Kalleberg, 2009), but the German case is more distinctive because of the 
political involvement at the individual level, which was instrumental in instigating 
changes to the regulatory framework.  
Conclusions 
The German temporary staffing industry has experienced rapid expansion since 
the enactment of the Temporary Employment Act in 1972. While the industry 
has grown in terms of number of agencies, and turnover, it has remained very 
fragmented by international standards. Although growing over time in size, 
agencies remain small, which may evidence a comparative advantage of the 
SMEs in the German system, but also the importance of spatial proximity of the 
agencies to their customer base, given the regional variations that Germany 
experiences in the wider labour market. Despite these regional specificities it 
has been the developments at the national level which have largely been 
discussed in this article. Further work is needed around the regional variations 
of the temporary staffing industry, investigating the role of transnational and 
domestic temporary staffing agencies the industry, as well as regional and local 
labour markets.  
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Successive waves of legislation reform regarding temporary agency work acted 
as a primary driver of change. Trade unions and trade associations were key in 
shaping changes in regulation alongside influences from the state – in particular 
the Federal Employment Minister – around issues of terms of use for temporary 
agency workers and their pay. Agencies have since responded to these 
changes, and have capitalised on the opening up of areas of the market from 
which they were previously excluded. As social partners who are linked through 
collective agreements for temporary agency work in Germany, both trade 
unions and trade associations had a crucial role in shaping the prevalence and 
experience of temporary agency work in Germany. Germany did not, until May 
2011, have a minimum wage as such for temporary agency workers. Minimum 
salaries were negotiated by sector via collective agreements between trade 
associations and unions.  
 
The actions of some in-house agencies prompted intervention by the state to 
ensure mistreatment of workers would be reduced. This demonstrated the 
potential for direct state intervention, led by individuals, in the activities of the 
TSI, which has not been the usual pattern in other more mature markets for 
temporary agency work (see Coe, Johns, Ward, 2008, 2009; Author 
forthcoming). Although some efforts were made by unions to engage with 
temporary agency workers, or with issues regarding their use, the underlying 
messages from trade unions remained negative. Trade unions stressed that 
temporary agency work should be used as a tool for short term flexibility as the 
labour market demands, not as a viable employment option. Nevertheless they 
engaged with the issue of TAW, developing from acknowledging collective 
agreements and campaigning against its use, to recognition of the TAW sector 
as a component in the workforce, and the development of strategies to 
incorporate some of their issues into their own activities.  
 
Much of the increased media attention that focused on temporary agency work, 
either driven by practices of in house agencies, activities of trade unions, or 
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discussions in political spheres focused on the use of temporary agency 
workers by larger companies. Given the fragmentation of the market identified 
earlier in this paper further research is needed to examine the experience of the 
small temporary staffing agencies, and the impact of changing regulatory 
frameworks on the everyday experiences of a temporary staffing agencies, 
particularly the SME component, and their temporary agency workforce in 
Germany. Furthermore given that the fragmented nature of the industry, 
compared to other European markets, more work is needed to explore their role 
in shaping the market, against the backdrop of changing regulations.  
 
The German temporary staffing industry provides an interesting example of 
where the industry has experienced significant development in a relatively short 
period of time, and where involvement of the state has been a crucial driver of 
change, particularly for attempting to mitigate exploitative practices of temporary 
staffing agencies. Despite the expansion of transnational agencies into the 
German market, and changing regulatory frameworks (from both Germany and 
the EU), it was the German state which continued to play a strong role in the 
operation of the temporary staffing industry.  Deregulation of temporary agency 
work acted as a spark for development, but the state later acted to protect 
temporary agency workers from exploitation through the introduction of 
regulations on pay and conditions. This highlights how the state can play both 
the role of a deregulator and re-regulator, and as such the potential for both 
dynamics should be considered in any exploration of a national temporary 
staffing industry or labour market landscape, alongside other key components 
including temporary staffing agencies (both transnational and domestic), trade 
unions, trade associations, and of course temporary agency workers.  
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